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still in progress. Considering that Alge-
rian intelligence has been exceptionally
successful at fighting terrorists, employ-
ing clandestine methods that are brutal
and nefarious even by regional stan-
dards, the absence of any analysis of Al-
geria cannot be explained.
In the end, Schattenarmeen is really a
collection of spy stories, many of them
of questionable provenance, and lacks
much overarching analysis. The stories
are entertaining and, based on this re-
viewer’s experiences, essentially true;
however, they are not a serious treat-
ment of an important subject. Instead,
Dietl has added to the unfortunate
genre of terrorism books, marred by
unattributed revelations, inadequate
analysis, and overheated rhetoric. The
major role played by Middle Eastern in-
telligence agencies in security matters
and nearly all regional politics is poorly
understood in the West and demands
detailed analysis. This is not the book to
fill that need.
JOHN R. SCHINDLER
Naval War College
Mueller, John. Atomic Obsession: Nuclear
Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al Qaeda. Oxford,
U.K.: Oxford Univ. Press, 2011. 319pp. $27.95
John Mueller has written an extensive
body of work on national security is-
sues, work that runs counter to the con-
ventional wisdom. Atomic Obsession, a
broad examination of the limited role
nuclear weapons have played in history,
examines the prospects for a terrorist’s
acquisition and use of a nuclear device.
Mueller argues that the expense of these
nuclear arsenals (perhaps as high as ten
trillion dollars over the course of the
entire Cold War, by one estimate) was
not worth it. He contends that the
memory of World War II, great-power
“contentment,” and fear of conven-
tional escalation were enough to pre-
vent the Cold War from going hot. He
cites historian Adam Ulam as stating
that Stalin “had great respect for the
United States’ vast economic and hence
military potential, quite apart from the
bomb.”
On the specter of proliferation, Mueller
points out that decades of predictions
of an imminent cascade of new mem-
bers in the nuclear club have not been
borne out, that warnings by Herman
Kahn that Japan would “unequivocably”
have an arsenal by 1980 (and similar
predictions concerning a unified Ger-
many) have not come to pass. Mueller
documents what he says is a sixty-year
history of nuclear alarmism, arguing
that this is the light in which we should
view current concern about proliferation.
The most engaging aspect of this im-
portant book is its section on nuclear
terrorism. Mueller, to my mind, demol-
ishes the casually constructed conven-
tional fears on the subject. Even rogue
regimes are highly unlikely to transfer
one of these expensive (and laboriously
acquired) weapons even to a trusted in-
dependent group, because of the poten-
tial for extreme danger to the state. Al-
Qa‘ida, the “chief demon group” in this
regard, is trusted by no one; its “explicit
enemies group includes not only Chris-
tians and Jews, but all Middle Eastern
regimes.”
Mueller documents how remarkably
difficult nuclear weapons are to steal
and use. Not even all weapons designers
are familiar with modern security safe-
guards, such as conventional explosives
within a nuclear weapon that render the
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weapon useless if precise operating pro-
cedures are not followed. Regarding con-
cern over terrorists building their own
bombs, it is very hard to steal fissile ma-
terial, and the work of constructing a
bomb is “difficult, dangerous, and ex-
tremely exacting.” A great deal of com-
plex experimentation, experimentation
beyond the capabilities of substate
groups, would be required.
Mueller points to a raft of alarming but
mistaken predictions about the likeli-
hood of a terrorist group using a nuclear
weapon. For example, John Negroponte,
as UN ambassador (2001–2004), sug-
gested that there was a “high probabil-
ity” that al-Qa‘ida would attempt to use
a nuclear weapon on the United States
within two years—an ominous warning
offered in 2003.
Those concerned by the threat of nu-
clear terrorism against the United States
are likely to find Atomic Obsession a well
argued, engagingly written, thought-
provoking, and ultimately reassuring
work.
ANDREW L. STIGLER
Naval War College
West, Bing. The Wrong War: Grit, Strategy, and
the Way Out of Afghanistan. New York: Random
House, 2011. 336pp. $28
“We have fought the wrong war with
the wrong strategy”—so ends Bing
West’s The Wrong War. West, a former
assistant secretary of defense and Ma-
rine officer with combat experience in
Vietnam, is an award-winning author
whose books have appeared on the New
York Times best-seller list and the Com-
mandant of the Marine Corps’s reading
list. His latest work is an engrossing
compilation of tactical vignettes, cata-
loging changes to the strategic and
operational-level approaches of two
administrations and six theater-level
commanders, over the ten-year history
of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM.
West’s concluding view on the key to
exiting Afghanistan, though perhaps an
oversimplification of the challenge, is
nonetheless a valid consideration for a
potentially long-term military commit-
ment in Afghanistan.
The strength of West’s work is in his
vivid descriptions of operations under-
taken by coalition and special opera-
tions forces (SOF) in Kunar and
Helmand Provinces. The author’s credi-
bility and ability to connect with war
fighters provide him intimate access to
small-unit leaders, resulting in narra-
tives of tactical-level successes that ulti-
mately evolved into strategic-level
failures. West also describes the com-
plexities of the regional, tribal, and
national-level political influences in Af-
ghanistan, the latter best illustrated by
operations in Nuristan Province forced
upon the coalition by President Hamid
Karzai. There are also numerous exam-
ples of what West describes as the “cul-
ture of entitlement,” whereby Afghan
leaders gain the benefits of coalition-
provided security and development
projects while seemingly providing—at
best—only neutrality in return. West’s
portrayals of the war fighters’ courage
and heartbreak are well supported by a
number of revealing photographs. His
method of numbering the photos for
specific reference in the text is particu-
larly effective. Aside from some minor
editorial errors, this work is remarkably
detailed yet still easy to follow, despite
the change over time in local leader-
ship, unit rotation, and the periodic
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